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Youth, Media and Culture in the Arab World
Abstract
'Traditionally, Arab society dealt with youth in a superficial and slightly condescending manner’, an Arab
columnist wrote recently, ‘offering the occasional sports club and scout troop, a usually underfunded and
dysfunctional govemment ministry or organization for youth issues, and a correspondingly noncredible
occasional speech by a highranking official stressing that youths are the promise of the future'(Khouri, 2005).
In light of this somber diagnosis with which many analysts of the Arab world would concur, it appears
paradoxical that, today, Arab youth is at the center of some of the most important and controversial debates,
from the impact of Western modernity on gender roles and social relations to consumerism and radical
political violence. The scope of these debates transcends the borders of the 22 states making up the Arab
world in a post September 11, 2001, environment where Arab youth has become a site that is contested both
internally and externally. Young Arab women and men are simultaneously subjected to competing and
oftentimes conflicting messages from their parents, educational and religious institutions, the vibrant Arab
satellite television industry, 'public diplomacy' from the USA, Iran and others, and the interlocking economic,
technological and cultural forces of globalization.
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INTRODUCTION 
‘ Traditionally, Arab society dealt with yOllth 
in a superficial and slightly condescending 
manner ’, an Arab columnist wrote recently, 
‘offering the occasional sports c1 11b and scout 
troop, a usually underfundεd and dysfunc• 
tional govemment rninistry or organization 
for youth issues, and a correspondingly 
noncredible occasional speech by a high-
ranking official stressing that youths are the 
promise of the future ’ (Khouri, 2005). In 
ligbt of lhis somber diagnosis with which 
many analysts of the Arab world wOllld 
concur, lt appεars paradoxical that, today, 
Arab youth is at the center of some of the most 
importallt and controversial debates, from 
the impact of Westem modernity on gendεr 
roles and socia1 relations to consumerism 
and radical political violence. The scope of 
these debates transcends the borders of the 
22 states making up the Arab world in a post 
September 11 , 2001 , environment where Arab 
youth has becornε a site that is contested 
both internally and extemally. Young Arab 
women and men are simultaneously subjected 
to competing and oftentimes conflicting 
messages from their parents, educational and 
religious instihltions, the vibrantArab satellite 
television industry, ‘Pllblic diplornacy’ from 
the USA, Iran and others, and the inter10cking 
economic, technological and cultural forces of 
globalization1 
The central role the rnedia play in the life 
of young people is widely acknowledgεd by 
scholars and policy-makers. Media and infor-
mation technologies are instrumεntal in both 
youth cultural consumption and production; 
as such, they shape the dynamics of youth 
culh1fe. In acknowledgement of this context, 
the exhaustive United Nations Youth Report 
2005 , states that ‘ it is impossible to under 
takean 얘εctive examination ofyouth cultures 
without e.λploring young peop/e ’s relationship 
with the media ’ (Departrnent of Economic 
and Social Affairs , 2005: 82, ernphasis 
added). Like youth in other parts of the 
world, young Arabs are avid users of mobile 
telephones and text-messaging, the inter-
net, satellîte tεlevision anJ popular music 
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Aggressive advertising campaigns and syner 
gies betwecn telecommunications and media 
companies promote these media consumption 
activitie‘ 111e explosion of commercial tele 
vision genres has contrìbuted to the crεatlOn 
of a ‘hypermedia space' (Kraidy, 2006a) by 
activating interactìve multimedia uses for 
television, the internet and mobile telephony 
As the development of this commercial 
hypermedia space has intensified debates 
about the socialization of youth and chil-
dren, these communication possibilities have 
ernpowered youth expression in new ways 
The mu1tifaceted and comp1εx relationship 
between Arab youth andmεdia may, therefore, 
be difficult to comprehend through traditiona1 
research approaches that focus on one type of 
media (te1evision, internet, etc.) or one issue 
(violence, sεxuality， etc.) 
This chapter attempts to provide a compre 
hensìve view of Arab youth and medìa that 
is multìdisciplinary, historically informed, 
and concεptua11y based. lt follows a top• 
down approach based on both secondm"y 
sourcεs and on fie1dwork at Arab media 
organizations. To meet this objective, we 
have organized the chapter into three main 
sections: The first focuses on socio• cu1tura1 
de-traditionalization, treating issues of chang-
ing cultural values and social nonns. The 
chapte, ’ s second section naITows down on the 
consumerist impεratives of the cornmercial 
Arab media environment, and discussεs topics 
such as advertising , multimedia synergies 
and product placements. The third section 
dìscusses the politica1 implications of media 
dirεcted at Arab youth, ranging from loca1 
FM radio stations to US propaganda in the 
context of the so-called ‘war on terronsm ’ 
Our analysis will focus on established and 
emerging trends in thε relationship between 
Arab youth and the media, dwelling on key 
case studies while refemng to a divεrsc range 
of examples (instihltions , genr야， medium) 
By ana1ytically linking 01d and new media 
in the lives of chi1dren and young peop1e, 
we hope this chapter provides a comparative 
perspective on an area of research that 
suffers, according to at least onε authontative 
account, from ‘fragmentation, small sarnple 
groups, non-comparability and a 재!estεrn 
cu1tura1 focus' (Depm"tmεnt of Economic and 
Socia1 Affairs, 2005: 84). Because of this 
chapter's broadscope which covers numerous 
countries, several media, and a vmiety of 
socîal and political issues , some degree of 
generalization is inevitable. We hope that 
readers wil1 make use of our references to 
accεss scholarship about specific Arab media 
lssues 
Thε existence of tensions between global 
mεdia-oriented youth culture and local tm 
ditions is beyond dispute. However, Arabs 
experience lhis c1ash in pmticularly acute 
fonn, for several reasons. First is the genera 
tiona1 gap betwεen contemporary Arab youth 
and their parents. According to the United 
Nations Popu1ation Fund, around 34% of the 
population of Arab countries is under the agε 
of 15 , and the median age for the Arab region 
is 22.2 There is vmiation between states, but 
young peop1ε make up between one-third 
and one-ha1f of nationa1 pop버ations. Whìle 
intergenerational differences are a universal 
phenomenon, in the Arab world thesε dif 
ferences ride a wave of fundamental and 
far-reaching changes that have occurred over 
the last 30 years in the political, economic, 
cu1tura1 and educational structures of most 
Arab countlies. These include the opening up 
since the 1960s of higher education to most 
Arabs, the transition from traditionaJ desert 
cu1ture to hyper-modern, oil-fuel1ed, media-
saturated economies in the Gulf countdes, 
the rise of political Islamisrn, and the major 
political and military upheavals experienced 
by Arabs in the 1ast few decadεs. Especially 
important in shaping social and political 
deve10pments in the Arab wor1d is what 
Eicke1man (1998) called the combination of 
‘mass education and mass communication’ 
Chances are that a 40-year 01d Arab fathe, 
today grew up in a world where there was 
only one state television channel, which did 
not air advcrtisemεnts， was the fìrst in his 
family to obtai n a uni versity dεgree， and has 
had a decent1y paid job with a govemment 
agency. His 1O-year-01d son, howζver， was 
born amidst the Arab information revolution, 
can choose between more than 200 sate11ite 
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tεlevision channels saturated with commercial 
me‘sages , surf the internet and use his 
mobile tclephone to vote for his favorite 
reality tclevision contestant or to request his 
fa、rorite music video. According to World 
Bank figures , the number of television sets 
per 1000 people in the Arab world is around 
200, double that of low~income countries 
(for example in sub~Saharan Africa), but 
much smaller than the number in high-income 
countries, which is abovε 600 (UNDP, 2004) ‘ 
IntClTIεt penetration in the Ar배 reglOn ranges 
from 30% of thε population in the United 
Arab Emiratcs to close to 0% in Sudan, 
with Lebanon at 10% and Saudi Arabia 
below 3% (UNDP, 2004), Experiences of this 
generational gap are different from onε Arab 
country to another, but the emerging reglonal 
youth culture, much of it revolving around 
hypennedia space, creates a sεnse of shared 
community among those who partake in it 
The intergenerational gap is widened not only 
by the newly available technologi않， but by the 
behaviors and vocabularies that youth culture 
devε:lops around rituals of consumption and 
technology use, which tend to be exclusive of 
aduIts 
The global youth culture, to which some 
young Arabs gravitate with various degrεes 
ofbεlonging determined by language ability, 
socio-economic c1ass and gωgraphicalloca 
tion , navigates contempormy hypermedia 
space through rituals of consumption, like 
wearing the same c10thing brands, listening 
to the same pop artists , eating the same fast-
food and watching the same movi앙 Thus , thε 
global, media-driven, consumption-centεred 
youth culture reproduces itsεIf through the 
ritualized consumption it promotes. This 
process does not necessarily lead to cu1tural 
homogenization. It mostly results in various 
fonns of cultural hybridity embodied in 
so• ca1led ‘world music ’ or in branded mix 
and~match clothing styles which indicate‘ that 
global youth culture is a hodge~podge of 
international cu1tural influences.3 
In the Arab world, this hybridity exac~ 
erbates intergenerational conflict because it 
hinders value transmission according to thε 
postfigurative (hierarchical and strict) mod리 
by introducing hoTÏzontal value transmission 
between young people wor1dwide and within 
the Arab region.4 This accelerates socio 
cultural change to the extent that it reduces 
parents’ infiuence on their children in favor of 
increasing theÎr exposure to peer and foreign 
cultural inftuences, and increases the appe따 
of re1igiously couched, anti-popular culture 
arguments espoused by many Arab Islamist 
groups and political parti얹 
At the same time, global culture is locally 
appropriated by the IsJamists, creating a 
diffεrent hybrid where local themes are 
gratìed onto global forms: examples incJude 
Sami Yusuf, a British-born Muslim with Azeri 
origins, who has εmerged as a creator of 
‘Islarnic music videos’, or, more generally, 
the advent of Islamic television. In the past, 
the notion of Islamic ‘programs ’ on Arab state 
television were lÌmited to short (flεw minutes) 
segments that reminded Muslims of prayer 
time five times a day. An εxception to this 
trend was state television in Gu1f countries, 
which routinely featured 1ive broadcasts of 
sermons, religious talk shows and scripture 
readings. The advent of satellite tεlevision 
paved the way for fully dedicated religious 
channels, rnostly based in Saudi Arabia with 
studios in Egypt and Dubai. For example, 
in 1998 the Saudi~owned Arab Radio and 
Television (ART) estab!ished ‘Iqraa’ (Read) 
as an Islamic channε1 appea1ing to wornen 
and youth worldwide. Until then, Saudi 
Channel One was the main re1 igious channel, 
wilh 50% religious-oriεnted programming 
lqraa ’s appεal rests in its 100% religlous pro-
gramming emulating entertainrnent television 
with several male and female ‘born-again ’ 
preachers , and live interaction with audiences 
The trend set forth by ‘ Iqraa’ was soon 
foJlowed by Al Majd (the Glory) and Al Risala 
(the Message). The first grew in 2002 out 
of a Saudi-owned Islamic publishing house 
to include seven television and radio sate1lite 
channels AI~Majd channel, a Kor ’an channel, 
a science channel, a historical channel, a 
news channel and two chi1dren’s channels 
The second, AI~Risala， was established in 
2006 as part of the Rotana network with a 
youth focus. It has a slick screen appearance 
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and features a mix of prayer, talk shows and 
mUSIC 
These channe1s helped create two typεs 
of religious star: the tele-nu띠is and tele-
dai ’a (or preachers). Starring in his Al Jazeera 
show titled Al Sharia wal Hayat (Islamic 
law and l(fe) , the Egyptian mufti Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi is‘ues religious opinions known 
as fatwas and discusses general social and 
political issues. TraditionaJly, the dai ’ a 18 a 
born-again Muslim who dedicates his life to 
rεligious preaching. Satel1 ite te1εVlSlOn gave 
dai’as like the Egyptian Amr Khaled superstar 
status. Khaled ’ s charisma, trendy clothing, 
and ‘modernist’ Islamic discourse focusing 
on youth has led to ovεr-the-air skinnishes 
between him and rnore establishεd re1igious 
leaders , like al-Qaradawi. In addition to 
fi1ling a market niche, mainstream Islarnic 
media are seen as an antidote to the radical 
and sometirnεs violεnt media underground, 
largely re'‘tricted to the internet. Also, by 
adopting ‘modern’ media technologies and 
styles to spread their message, Islamic 
media indicate that as ‘ the cultura1 10gic 
of globalization ’ (Kraidy, 2005), hybridity 
can sometimes operate as counter-logic. In 
other words , hybIidity can reftect intercul 
tura1 relations with various distdbutions of 
poweI 
Unlike the fami1y-focused, living• room 
basεd， fixed←time radio listεning or television 
viewing of the past, the new hypennedia 
space is basεdonpεrsonalized， interactive and 
mobile communication devices and practices 
Therεfore， it weakens the bonds of collective 
socia11ife on Arab chi1dren and young peop1e, 
contributing to thè transformation of their 
cultural identities by changing the sources 
they use for ‘ identity work’ (Ziehe, 1992) 
Although se1ecting foreign, regiona1 (Arab) 
and local elements for identity construclion 
existed before the advent ofhypermedia space 
(e.g. see Havens (200 J) and Kraidy (1 999)), 
the environment permits a proliferation of 
cultural sources of identity. Also , the intε:rac 
tivity of text-messaging and intemet chatting, 
for examp1e, challenges the traditiona1, top 
down modeJ of socialization by making 
young Arabs active cultural producers. These 
developments reftect an intergenerational 
leap, since the media world of previous 
gεnerations of Arabs consisted mostly of daily 
newspapers and state television chalme1s‘ 
These were cu1tural1y policed in ordεr to 
promote national identity and unity, and 
technically 1imited to the onε way, non 
interactive, transrnÎssion of infonnation. The 
combination of an ever-increasing number of 
cultural sources of identity with the interactive 
possibilities of hypennedia presents two 
challenges 
First, although the media provide some 
of the most significant component‘ for 
bu i1ding youth identity, the constmction of 
Arab youth identity is complicated by the 
paucity of indigenous cultural production, 
including books, cinema and , to a lesser 
extent, television. While the hypermedia 
space involvεs numerous media and infor-
mation technologies, television remains the 
dominant medium, and television, even when 
in the Arabic language, Îs permeated by 
Western ideas and values. In other words, 
sources from which young, εspeciaJ1y rniddle• 
class, English-speaking, Arabs draw on whεn 
defining their identity tend to be inftuenced by 
Wεstern， mostly US , popu1ar culture and its 
focus on individual identity and consumerÏsm 
(Khalil , 2005). T죄is is a reflεction of the 
crisis of Arab cultural production at large, 
detailed in the Arab Hwnan Development 
Report 2003 , which was written by Arab 
inteI1ectuals andrεsεarchεrs under the aegìs of 
the United Nations Development Programme 
and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Dεve10pment. Chapter 3, ‘Knowledge pro 
duction in arab countries ’, gives a view of thc 
CriSIS ‘ Arab countries, with 5% of the wor1d’s 
population, produce J. J % of the world ’s 
books, a figure that falls be10w 1 % if we 
on1y consider literary books. Wìth a potential 
audience of 270 million Arab speakcrs in 
22 countrie1、 on1y 1000 to 3000 copies of 
a novel are usually pub1ished (UNDP, 2004 
77-78). Theatrical and cinematic production, 
III spltε of the famed Egyptian cinema and the 
emergence of high-quality Syrian te1εVlSIOn 
drama, mirrors this situation. Batlered by cell 
sorship, undermined by widespread illiteracy 
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and hlndered by the lack of funding, Arab 
litermy and dramatÎc creative talent is-unable 
to thrivc 
Profiting from state-private cooperation, 
tclevision drama has raised the profile and 
the income of writers in countries likε 
Egypt and Syria and to a 1ι‘ser extent 
Lebanon and the Gulf countries. But this trend 
has been thwarted, since tclcvision officials 
prefer the low-risk, high-yield strategy of 
f01mat adaptation. Hence, the wave of reality 
te1evision, game-shows, music videos and 
other formats imported from North America 
or Europe domÎnates Arab entertainment 
television, most starkly transnational satellite 
telεvision. Thεse shows present ‘Western ’ 
formats that are adaptεd and reproduced 
in Arabic by Arab directors, actors and 
participants, and are often embedded in 
synergistic strategies including advel1ising OI 
sponsorship dεals， in addition to audio music 
and music video deals. As we explain later 
in this chapteι this mixing of wor1dviews 
has frequently triggered controversy for 
promoting commercialism and W，εstern←style 
social relations bεtwεen fernales and mal잉， 
and for sapping putative Arab or Islamic 
identities 
Differεntial access to thε new Arab hyper-
rnedia space is the second problem. The 
advent of a comrnercial rnedia environrnent 
tends to exclude thoseArabs who are not desir 
able targεts of advertisers. It is wε11 known 
that the focus of the ovenνhεlming majority 
of Arab media products are the countries of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, which inc1 udes 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the 
Unitεd Arab EmiTates and Knwai t. Television 
programmers and othel' ‘content providcrs ’ 
focus mostly on Saudi Arabia, by far the 
largest and wealthiest Arab market. Program 
previews and promotions on most satellite 
telεvision channels, for example, give the 
time of a pal1icular program in ‘Saudi Arabia 
Time’ in addition to GMT 0'- the timε of the 
location of the channel. With the growing 
financialimportance of mobile phone toll cal1s 
or text messages in the context of voting in 
reality television prograrns, requesting music 
videos or sending love me‘sages on mUSlC 
channels, the Arab media industry’s focus 
on the oil-rich Gulf countries is increasing 
and reshaping production and programming 
decisions 
The rising importance of thε rnarkets of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Ernirates exacerbates the socio-economic gap 
between poor and rich Arab countries as 
the Arab public sphere becomes increasingly 
dominated by the desires, interests and voicεs 
of the wealthy. Poor young Arabs with blεak 
employment prospects and restricted social 
conditions are reduced to watching advertisers 
cater to a select g이den Arab youth as thεy 
ftaunt designer c1othes , hip mobile phones and 
extravagant lifestyles. Whilε this is to some 
extent true of commercial media wor1dwide, 
the large income differences and the speed 
with which the Arab media shifted from 
state←contro11εd monopolies to companies 
motivated by a mixture of commercial and 
political interests further complicate the 
situation. Highly popular reality television 
programs, which include participants frorn 
many Arab countries, milTor the inter-Arab 
cleavage with the Gulf countries on one 
side and everyone else on the other. Both 
a1liances between contestants on these shows 
and audiencε voting patterns fa l1 into this 
pattern in which diffεrences in social class and 
sub-regional identÎties overlap 
The paucity of indigenous cultural pro 
duction and differential access to the media, 
the two problεrns discussαJ above, indicate 
that the cornmercial media envirornuent 
contributes significantly, both vertical1y and 
horizontal1y, to segregation of the Arab 
population. Vertically, it isolate1‘ young people 
from their parents. In addition to a commu 
nicative umverse replete with logos, words, 
symbols and icons that arε Western inspired 
and unpalatablε to their parents, privileged 
young Arabs are increasingly spending Jeisure 
time surfing the internet, chattìng on mobìle 
phones , playing video games or watching 
youth• specific programs on television 낌lese 
relativεly solitary activitiζs are transform 
ing Arab social relations and older media 
consumption habits that had been based on 
cornmunal listening or viewing followed by 
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group or family conversations (this follows 
a sin피ar trend towards indlvidual usage 
in the West; for example, see Livingstonε 
and Bovill (1 999)). Horizontally, the new 
commercial media enviromnent discriminates 
between young people on the basis of social 
economic status. The focus on the wealthy 
Gulf countries and the upper middle class in 
major cities 1ike Cairo, Damascus or Beirut 
risks exacerbating class divisions both within 
and between Arab countries. The media’s 
exc1usion of large segments of the Arab 
population who are not relevant to advertisεrs 
raises a set of important qu않tions about 
politìcal p따ticipation in Arab socìeties, to be 
discussed later in tms chapter 
ARAB YOUTH BETWEEN GLOBAl 
CULTURE AND LOCAL AUTHENTICITY 
In the new communication environment that 
significantly ovεrlaps with a global, media 
drìven youth culture, young Arabs have 
found a new space of socialization that 
is deeply permeated by ‘foreign' cultural 
and socia1 values, a process that started 
several centurìes earlier with missionaries 
in the Levant but that is more rεcent In 
the Gulf region. The Arab world is similar 
in this r앉pect to other paπs of the world 
where youth rnedia culture now compεtes 
with traditional farn i1y-based social structure‘ 
in the socialization of children and young 
peop1e. This process, which is embedded in a 
larger trend of ‘dεtraditiona1ization’ 아leelas 
et al‘, 1996), is accelerating the creation 
of hybrid cultural forms and identities (for 
example in Lebanon; see Kraidy (1 999)) 
in processes where yOllth cobble together 
social identities from a resεrvoir of resources 
in which youth media cu1ture loorns large 
What makes the Arab countnes distinct is 
that it is a region in which pllblic discourse 
is consumed by concerns for identity and 
authenticity, within a field defined at one 
end by Islamic piety and re1igious identi-
fication (and that includes Christians such 
as Egyptian Copts and Lebanese Maronites) 
and at the other end by Arab nationalism 
and political identification. The current geo • 
political upheavals rocking the Arab region, 
such as the invasion of Traq and the protracted 
confiict between Israelis and Palestinians, 
have intensified concerns about identity at a 
time when the USA has made it a policy to 
change the political , economic and culture 
stnlctures of Arab cOllntries. At the same time, 
the isslle of political reform is a pεnnanent 
fixture in Arab public discourse and is perhaps 
the only area where secular liberals agree with 
Islamist activists 
In this context, Arab media targεtmgyoung 
people play a balancing act, on the one 
hand respecting e‘tablished traditions , but at 
the same time introducing new ideas both 
for commercial reasons and also as a socia1 
and political imperative. Commercially, Arab 
mεdia εntrepreneurs are cognizant that the 
consumerism and sexualized semiotics of 
global youth culture offer tremendous profit 
opportunities. They also know that young 
Arabs are alienated by the often poorly 
PH띠uced programs that state channels offer 
them, preferηng an informal and interactive 
style, a situation in which thεy are similar 
to Western youth (e.g. Buckingham, 2000) 
Socially and politically, there is a general 
sense that the status quo is llntenable, and 
some refonn-minded media owners iI벼]se 
the ne\ν communication environment with 
their ideas about refonning Arab societies 
Nowhere ls this search for a balanced recipe 
nn잉ng tradition and modernity, entertain• 
ment with a social message, morε visible 
than in the case of the Rotana rnedia 
conglomerate 
The history of Rotana mirrors that of its 
owner, Saudi Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, a 
‘forward-thinking ’ member of the Saudi royal 
family and a Lebanese citizen by virtue of 
his Lebanese mother. Bin Ta1al is a successful 
globa1 investor whose media holdings have 
inc1udζdthε satellite channcl of LBC and 
Murr Television, a now-defunct Lebanese 
station, in addition to Rupert Murdoch’sNews 
Corporation, CNBC and StarTY. In 1995 , Bin 
Talal acqui.red 25% of Saudi-based Rotana 
Audio Visual Company, which specializes 
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in the production and dist!ibution of Arab 
music. Bin Talal'8 interest in music production 
increased over the years and 80 did his shares 
in Rotana, from 48% in 2002 to 100% in 
20035 
Bin Talal's plan to build amεdia empire that 
integrated music production and distribution 
led him in 2003 to acquire the music channel 
of the Arab Radio and Television (ART) 
bouquet. Rebranded Rotana, it expanded 
mto a nεtwork of four music channels, 
one movie channel and a religious chan-
nel callεd al-Risala. Valued at over US$l 
bi1l ion, Rotana has more than 2500 music 
videos and 5000 recordεd li ve performances 
Bin Talal is now capable of producing , 
distributing and marketing any singer in• 
house. Wh ile Kingdom Holding (Bin Talal's 
major company) and Rotana music are based 
in Saudì Arabia, Rotana television is based 
ìn Beirut. Rotana’ s four music channels 
do not follow MTV’s tradition of using 
video jockeys (VJs) in the programs; instead 
the VJs are charged with tying different 
programs or sequences together. For Ínstance, 
on the Rotana Khaleejiyyah, specializing in 
Arabian Gulf music, the VJs recite poεtry 
as interludεs between sets of music videos 
Except for Rotana Clip, which caries audience 
requests, the three channels have regular 
prograrnming that is primarily youth oriented 
By ‘ translating’ the MTV VJ tradition for an 
Arab audience and inserting poetry (a highJy 
popu때 literary form in the Arab world) 
between songs, Rotana εffectively localizes 
elements of the global youth culture 
Another localization strategy is visible 
in one show that addresses youth culture 
directly, Rotana Café. Following a wave of 
youth-oriented magazine shows that started 
in 2001 , RotallG Café showcases the latest 
Rotana music videos and reviews interna-
tional movies , gossip and fashion σεnds 
Presented by Lebanese, Egyptian, Saudi and 
Kuwaiti teεnagers ， this daiIy one-hour show 
Îs set in a relatively large studio resembling a 
café. Tt is characterized by a relaxed attitude 
where presenters casually interact with a 
handhεld camera while answering inquiries 
from callers about the most recent celebrity 
rumors. The framing of the program as a 
coffeehouse with free-wheeling and informal 
dialogue echoes the traditional role of the 
coffeehouse as a micro-public sphere in Arab 
and Ottoman culture.6 However, unlike the 
male• only coffeεhouses that still exist in Arab 
cities, the program features both genders as 
presenters and guests, i1lustrating a subtle 
process of localization, which εntails gratìing 
local themes and traditions onto the global 
music television genre, a process resulting 
in the partial transformation of these local 
thernes and traditions 
Rotana ’s business strategy i1l ustrat얹 how 
Arab corporations profit from hypermedia 
space. Rotana’s commercial viab i1ity rests 
to a large extent on what industry insiders 
call value-added services (VAS). These are 
available in the form of web dow띠oads ， 
short message services (SMS) displayed on 
a lower third ticker, multÎ-media services 
(MMS), ring tone and web downloads. In 
additìon to being profitable, these services 
stimulatε dernand for prograrnming and 
increase the prospects of synergy with other 
services. The Rotana Clip channe1 is a 
VAS fiagship , since it f，εatures a number 
of interacti ve activities: chatting, J\.α1S and 
SMS. Rotana Khaleejiyyah rεceived as rnany 
as 50,000 SMS messages during its first 3 days 
on the air. 7 Through promotional c1ips , Rotana 
contributes to cultivating text mcssaging as a 
way of life for young Arabs who use Rotana’s 
on-screen ticker to send messages to each 
other, inc1uding love messages or simply to 
inform friends that the sender will be late to 
an appOJntment 
Rotana’s mantra of maintaining a conserva 
tive identity compatible with Saudi traditions 
but also introducing Bin Talal's relatively 
1iberal views makes this channel a hyblid 
space in which traditions overlap with modern 
technologies. The choice ofLebanon , theArab 
world ’s most culturally liberal country, as its 
major site of operation, reficcts this policy 
While Rotana’s VAS indicate that the channel 
is cognizant of and cu1tivates hip trends 
among Arab youth, Rotana’s comrnitment to 
Islamic religious practices is a clear indication 
of its commitment to tradìtion. Dming theholy 
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month of Ramadan, present리 s dress more 
conservatively and music videos are carefully 
selected. TIrroughout the year, programming 
is inteπupted for prayer five times a day for 
5 minutes as slick gr‘aphicsovεrlaid with video 
footage of pilgrims praying in Mεcca ca11s 
viewers to prayer. When the Saudi King Fahd 
died in 2005 , Rotana paid tribute to its Saudi 
owner‘ hip by broadcasting mourning)lJusìc 
for several days. At the S3mε time, Rótana 
programs reftect relatively progressivε Vlews 
on women ’s rights, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and terrorisrn. 
Rotana reflεcts a wider trend across the 
industry, staying within thε SOClO• political 
bounds of the Saudi mainstream whilε mtro-
ducing nεw elements from both the global 
media industry and global youth culture to 
lming audiences. In the following section 
we analyze several youth media ‘ sites’ to 
explain how commercial and socio-po1itical 
concerns overlap and shapεArab youth media 
to various degrees. Located on a continuum of 
most to least commεrcialized ， we analyze one 
Lebanese television program, Mini Studio , 
followed by a discussion of MBC 3 and 
Space Toons, a satellite channel dedicated to 
youth entertainment, and AI-Jazeera Children 
Channel, a rεcent venture launched under the 
mantra of ‘edutainment’ 
ARAB YOUTH BETWEEII! 
CO II!SUMERISM AII!D EDUCAT’Oll! 
Arab mεdia have bεcome increasingly com-
mercial in thε past decade. Lebanese media 
were the ear1y Arab pioneεrs in producing 
commercially viable television programs. The 
mushrooming of private television stations 
in the 1990s in the absεnce of an adequate 
regulatory framework revived Lebanon as 
the most dynamic Arab media market for 
somε time, a role Lebanese television held 
in the 1970s when it exported drama series 
to the emerging Gulf government television 
channels.8 It is in this context that ιlini 
Studio , following a French tradition of 
children programs, was launched by MU lT 
Television in 1992, first in Lebanon only, and 
later in the Arab world when MTV began 
satellite broadcasting in the late 1990s. The 
program moved to LBC in 2002. Tbis daily 
half-hour show follows a magazine format 
featuring a regular group of performers and 
guεst characters, with various parts, such as 
storytεlling， songs, cartoons ànd games ‘ 
The show went through several stages 
First, it focused on a simple magazine format 
with various segments, such as storytelling, 
gadgets and birthdays. It featured children as 
a studio audience. It emphasized a European 
‘ feel ’, both in terrns of thε way the characters 
were dressed and the song lydcs in French and 
English. In the second stage, it maintained thε 
previous elements with a focus on youngel 
perfonners, as wel1 as including children 
as actual talent. A main change was the 
inclusion of product placement as well as 
sεgment sponsors. The perforrners/hosts plug 
products either by using or distributing them 
to the studio audience. In addition, the show 
expanded into ancillary productions: plays , 
video cassettes and CD song compi1ations 
As a result of this commercia1 success, the 
television and advertising industdes dubbed 
the show as ‘Mini Market’ ‘ Aftεr being 
launched on a pan-Arab scale first through 
h‘TV in 2000 and currently through LBC, 
Mini Studio adapted to this new demographic 
by including English as a second language 
for songs and dialogue. Producers of the 
show selected, supported and promoted an 
all-singing-and-dancing childrεn band under 
the name Kids' Power. 9 
Mini Studio was a pioneering Arab tele 
vision program for children. Culturally, it 
blurred the language barriers, as its performers 
crossed between Arabic, English and French, 
reflecting the Arabs’ colonial past and the 
currεnt multilinguallandscape where English 
has bεcome a global language, permeating 
youth mεdia culture. Economical1y, this show 
revolutionized the ways the advertising indus 
try targeted children; it introduced systematìc 
product placernent, with members of the 
audiencε shown on camera using products 
placed in the show and advertised during 
commercial brealcs. This helped spread the 
notion that children’s television in the Arab 
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world can be a profìtable business, a lesson 
that was not lost on the Middle East 
Broadcasting Center as it was εxpan며ng 
operations by essentially becoming a network 
A key element in that expansion is MBC 3, a 
channel exc1usively dedicated to children and 
young people 
Almost 15 years after its launch , thε 
Middle East Broadcasting Center rnoved to 
create a multicasting platform for the Arab 
family. Moving from a traditional, one-
channel, general audience approach, MBC 
now has two channels targeting young peoplε 
MBC 2 offers Western movies that attract 
both youth and their parents , and has been 
particularly succεssful in Saudi Arabia, where 
movie theaters are banned. MBC 3, launched 
from Dubai in 2005 to preempt the launch 
of the AI-Jazeera Children Chamlel, focuses 
exc1usively on childrεn and youth. During 
the aftεmoon， MBC 3 features young VJs 
who introduce the shows , comrnent on them 
and Ínteract with the audience via telephone 
Program offerings are primarìly frorn the USA 
and the UK, broadcast in English, but also 
inc1 ude Arabic-dubbed shows 1icensed from 
Space Toons , another Arab channel 
Taking advantage of the facilities provided 
by Dubai Media City, Space Toons w‘lS 
launched with a large Iibrary of children’s 
programs in Arabic. Its Sylian owner, Fayez 
Sabbagh, has a long history of dubbing 
and distlibuting various Asian and Europcan 
cartoons in Arabic. Space Toons broadcasts 
cartoons back to back in Arabic with commer-
cial breaks in-between, eschewing program 
presenters conllilOll on Arab television. Space 
Toons soon grew into a media l1Ub for 
chi1dren’s programming. In addition to sup• 
plying MBC 3 with prograrns, Space Toons is 
carried by the Orbit pay-κlevision ‘bouquεt’， 
which blings in additional incomc as wel1 as 
accεss to pay-for-television audicnces. It also 
branched into Space Toons English, broad 
casting Oliginal versions of its dubbed Arabic 
programs. Fina11y, and most interestingly, 
Space Toons ventured into producing its own 
Arabic cartoons in the fOffilS of vignettes 
dεaling with religious themes, such as ‘ Rihlat 
EIH엠’， about the Muslirn pilgrirnage, and 
Ramadan issuεs. This is another example of 
‘ localization’， whεre local themes are grafted 
onto global formats to create culturally hybrid 
programs. 
A venture of this scope is viable because 
it is integrated in a media conglomerate with 
three types of ancillary business: a magazine 
targeting parents and ch i1dren , cornmercial 
representation and advertising of toys, and 
a website which ties in a11 these activities 
by offering online games and downloads 
Followìng the logic of integration, the mag 
azine carries telεvision program schedules, 
the toys are flεaturcd in the programs, and 
thε wε:bsitc functions as a gateway to the 
Space Toons brand. While this company is 
a case Shldy of the commercialization of 
children and youth rnedia culture in the Arab 
world, some of its rivals propound a radically 
diffεrent vision of the role of thε media in the 
socialization of childr，εn and young people 
Reftecting a long-tcrm media Iiva1ry 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Saudi 
ownεd MBC 3 was rushεd into being to 
‘ scoop’ the ìmrninent launch of the Qatari• 
owned Al-Jazeera Children Channe1. While 
the two channels compete plimarily for the 
Gulf Cooperation Council countrìes ’ audi 
ence, they reftect two different ph i1osophies 
of youth media, with the former being a 
commercial station and the latter proc1aiming 
a public serv ice mission. For that reason , 
the AI-Jazeera Children Channel , launched 
on September 9, 2005, jointly by Al-Jazeera 
and the Qatar Foundation for Education, 
Science anJ Community Development, is 
worlhy of a detailed exarnination. The Qatar 
Foundation, public1y financed by the Qatari 
state and headed by Sheikha Moza Bint 
Nasser Al-Missned, wife of Qatru ’s ruler, 
owns 90% of the venhlre, which broadcasts 
from Education City in Qatar‘ 10 The channεl 
came on the heels of the flagship Al-Jazeera, 
AI-Jazeera SpOltS , AI-Jazeera live (public 
affairs) and the impending launch of the 
English-language Al-Jazεera English. II 
Most distinctive about the new channel is 
the fact that it is ‘a private company but 
with a pub1ic service mission and is publicly 
funded ’ , in the words of Jean Rou i11y, CEO of 
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Lagardere Intemational Images, a subdivisîon 
of the Prench conglomerate Lagardere, which 
was instrumental in setting IIp the chan 
nel technically. lO Thus , Al -Jazeera Childfiεn 
Channel is not a commercial channel, but, 
as Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer aI-Thani , 
chair of the board of AI-Jazeera, explains, 
a ‘bright alternative to thε CUlTcnt trends in 
telcvision broadcasting where children are 
exposed to violent and inappropriate material 
on a daily basis' (Ohrstrom, 2005). However, 
the new channel eschewεd the didactic 
style of Arab educational or devεlopment 
tclevision programs, aiming to provide what 
executives called ‘educatîonal fun ’ 10 whi1e 
inculcating valuεs such as tolerance, open-
mindedness and freedom of expression. In 
press statements, the new channel espouses 
the concept of ‘edutainrnent’, through which it 
‘opens up avenues for the Arab children to 
leam about different ... cultures ... landJ help 
them develop posìtive self-esteem, respεct 
their traditions and values , and appreciate 
people around thlεm and develop a passion for 
learnin !l’ 12 l l 
The declared commitment to local produc 
tion expressed in statements by AI-Jazεera 
Children Channe1 executives makes the chan 
nel 이에따tive， at least until actual program• 
ming grids prove otherwise. The channel’s 
programrning grid comprises around 40% of 
original programrning, amounting to 6 or 7 
hours a day out of the 18 to 19 hours of 
transmission (Ohrstrom, 2005). According 
to ch31mel director I\’ahnoud Bouneb, the 
channel wi11 broadcast 18 hours per day, out 
of which 6 hours are live, 3 hours are com 
missioned abroad and 4 hours are produced 
in thε channel’s studios. 13 The locally madε 
programs did not shy away from controversy 
Within 1 month after launch , Seh/w wa 
SalamQ (Health and Sqfety) broached the 
issue of female genital circumcision, and 
other programs featureù children opining on 
relatively sensitive social and political issues 
(Ohrstrom, 2005). This is within AJ• Jazeera ’s 
overall spirit to broach taboo issues 
An article published on the Aljazeera.nεt 
website provides a rationale for the 
channe1. Titlεd ‘ AI-Jazeera Children 
Channel ... A reading of the notion and 
a crÎ tique of the vision ’ , the 3l1icle argues that 
the new channel fills an important gap in Arab 
media because ‘ there were ambitioLls projects 
aiming to care for children, but they did not 
show children a real interest and dedicated 
themselves to tal싸ng about hobbies and 
mOVles ’ and carries a stinging indictment 
of Arab media as ‘mεdia that jump at thε 
peels in the absence of an 앉sence ... arε 
in a11 their fonns sterile’ (Bouqanoun , 2005) 
In contrast, AI-Jazeera ChiJdren Channel 
would advocate that Arab children should 
have a voice and be productive membεrs 
of their societies ‘We must address Arab 
C벼dren in an interactive manner ’, the 
writer says, ‘ so as to transfonn them into 
instruments of knowledge and givε them 
a productive capacity so that they express 
their opinions on issues that Înterest them 
and contribute to the foundation of a better 
future' (Bouqanoun, 2005). The new channel 
would thus contribute to εducational refonn 
throughout the Arab world by empowering 
children and young people and focusing on 
sclf-criticism and engagement in intercultural 
dialognes. The author also under1ines thε fact 
that the channel was crεated out of ‘a strong 
politic며 wi11’, widely assumed to be that of 
Qatm ’s influential first lady, and that becausε 
of this support it was going to be viable 
For all thesεprollllsεs ， theAI-Jazeera Chil 
dren Channel st i11 faced numerous problems 
First, setting it up was a long affair that 
exceeded its budget. Plans callεd for a fully 
digitized, completely ‘ tape-lcss’ operatlOn 
from production to transmissÎon. However, 
softwarε and budgeting problems , along 
with varying visions of sεveral key actors, 
undermined this aim. 14 Second, [rom thε 
vely first days of broadcasting, the new 
channε1 attractεd criticism for delivering le~써 
than what it‘ launchers promised. Because 
of the AI-Jazeera legacy, the chamlel faced 
skepticism even before its launch. In a column 
titled ‘The children of AJ-Jazeera’ , lbrahim 
며 Ariss (2이)5) ， editor for television and 
cinema at the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, hoped 
that the channel will not promote extremism, 
and that ‘ language lessons not be to learn 
i 
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how to wlite ta핸ri statements ... and that 
program guests llot be from outside of thlε 
era’ 15 Six weeks later, acolumnist in thε same 
newspaper poignantly criticized the station fm 
‘ putting amateurs in charge' and for having 
young adult talk-show hosts who knew less 
than their children guests about thε tOplCS 
under discussion (Arnin , 2005). While these 
critiques are at least partiaIIy valid, more time 
18 neεded before a systematic appraisal of 
the channel ’s perronnance can be conducted ‘ 
It is also important to note that the channel ’s 
avowed pub1ic service mission makes it a 
unique children-01iented media institution in 
the Arab world , 16 
The sudden interest ofleading transnational 
Arab broadcasters to youth channels needs 
careful assεssment. Arguably, the need for 
specific demographics to attract advertisers 
is important, but it cannot sole]y explain the 
surgε of interes t. MBC 3 can bε understood 
as an attempt to prepare loyal adult audîences 
for its llagship channel as the MBC network 
reinvents itself as the one-stop channel for the 
Arab family. In addition, MBC 3 is free to 
air, with no costs incurred by thε Vlewers ‘ 
Furlhermore, MBC 3 has been seliously 
attempting to present itself as a Gulf-based 
channeJ. U nlike Al-J azeera Children Channel, 
its road shows have focused on the Arabìan 
Gulf. While the use of English programs is 
attributed 10 a scarcily of Arab children ’S 
productions, it a180 reflects a mu1tilingua1 
audience. Thε choice of ‘Space Toons ’ as a 
name for another ch i1dren’s channel reflects 
the growing pervasiveness and acceptance 
of English by Arab audiences, itself a 
symptom of media globalization. But if these 
channels' prograrns are revealing about the 
sociaI and commercìal dimensions of Arab 
youth, other mεdia take on a more political 
dimension, whether directly as in the case 
ofthε US-funded ‘ public diplomacy’ stations 
Radio Sawa and AI-Hurra television, or in 
the casε of rea1ity television shows that 
were politicized by viewers and appropriated 
in street demonstrations, most notably in 
Beirut. The following section of this chaptel' 
examines how Arab youth popular culture 
intersects with Arab politicallife 
POLITICS. lI'OU I\IG PEOPLE AI\II> THE 
MEI>IA 11\1 THE ARAB WORW 
Because of the current geo-political juncture, 
rnyriad issues related to Arab rnass rnedia 
have been politicized between theArab world 
and the West, especially the USA, but even 
more significantly, within the Arab world 
itself. Since the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq by the USA and some allied forces , the 
Arab satel1ite news channels have been the 
sources of anxiety among Westem , rnainly 
American, politicians and mi1itary leaders 
Most of this anxiety and anger have focused 
onAl-Jazeera, with some accusing the channel 
of cooperating with AI-Qaeda and the Iraqi 
insurgency. While a dεtai1ed discussion of 
these important issues falls beyond the scope 
of this chapter, American perceptions that 
Arab meclia al'e hostile to lhe USA has 
triggered major initiatives under the pub-
lic diplornacy umbrella, including AI-Hun'a 
television , Radio Sawa, and Hi Magazine 
Urùike AI-Huna , a news and public affairs 
television channel for Arabs of a11 ages , Radio 
Sawa was consciously conceived as a blend 
of news and entertainrnent targeted at Arab 
youth, hencε its relevance to this chapter 
Radio Sawa is the brainchild of the 
Broadcasting Boal'd of Govemors, the body 
responsible for American intemational broad-
casts referred to as ‘public diplomacy ’ bytheir 
proponεnts and ‘propaganda’ by critics, This 
station offlεrs a format that appeals to youth by 
focusing mostly on music , a sharp departurε 
from Voice of America’s Arabic service ’s 
blend of news , CUITent affairs, documentaries 
and musÎc. The station was officially launched 
in March 2002, and by late summer 2002 it 
was reaching more Arab listeners than had 
the Voicc of America (Boyd, 2002) , Indeed , 
Sawa is the only (relative) success story in 
the US public diplomacy initiative towards the 
Arab world , considering that Hi Magazine was 
shutdown in Decembel' 2005 and the status 
of A1 -Hun'a television is in question as of 
this writing, with the channel facing high 
level slaff departures in thε wake of several 
surveys showing it with 1않s than 1 % of the 
Arab television news audience. Radio Sawa ’s 
YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 347 
success is partly due to the recognition by its 
overseers of the power of popular cu1ture to 
reach young Arabs 
Sa、Na’ s great ìnnovation was a station for 
mat that mixed Arabic and English-language 
pop music with short newscasts every hour. 
How trus radio station was received is perhaps 
best deSClibed in the numerous stories of taxi 
drivers in Arab capitals listening to Sawa 
music and switching to another channel when 
the newscast began only to move the dial 
back when the new hour of rnusic came 
in. Arabs liked thε music and 1istened to it, 
but the newscasts were not credible because 
listeners knew it was a US govermnent 
sεrvice. However, the innovative fonnat was 
SQon emulated by other stations, including 
Marina FM in Kuwait, thε first private FM 
station in that country and one that is rapidly 
gaining 1isteners. Although il111ovative, this 
fOlmat is not unprecedented in the rεglOn ， as 
some of the music video sate1lite television 
channels mixed Arabic and Westem pop 
several years before the advent ofRadio Sawa 
If Radio Sawa showed Washington policy 
rnakers that young Arabs can be reached 
by mixing politics with popular culture, 
the emerging hypermedia space gave young 
Arabs new opportunities for self-expression 
and participation in public life. The wave of 
reality television and music video prograrns 
and channels is evidence of the rampant 
commercialization of Arab hypennedia space 
But these programs also provide Arab youth 
with thε tools to parlicipate in public debates 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the way 
the rituals of reality television were ‘recruited’ 
in what We얀elTI observers ca11ed thε ‘Cedar 
Revolution’ in Lebanon. 17 
The series of street demonstrations that 
occurred in Beirut in the wake of the 
assassination of Lebanon’ s previous Prime 
Minister Rafiq al-H따iri were perhaps the 
first major Arab political event in which 
the emerging hypermedia space played a 
visible role. Demonstrators used mobile 
phones and text-messaging to mobilize and 
organize supporters, exchange crucial tactical 
infonnation, anJ take picture ‘ that could 
be easily transmitted out of the area of 
the demonstrations. Young people played 
a pivotal part in the demonstrations, with 
university student organizations as the 1εading 
organizational force. There was clear media 
savvy among the young demonstrators, who 
used color-coordínated clothing and painted 
Lε:banese flags on their faces likε football 
fans worldwide. Morε ìmportan t1y, several 
media friendly ‘ spectacles ’ were organized, 
including a gigantic human Lebanese fiag 
made by 10,000 Pεople holding green, red 
and white cardboard squares, the Lebanese 
colors. Most interesting were the signs that 
demonstrators carrieJ, which included words , 
phrases and slogans from re머ity television, 
such as ‘ Addoum, Nominee’ , which called 
for the sacking of Lebanon ’s pro-Syrian 
prosecutor general 
On March 14, 2005 , when approximately 
1 million demonstrators filled Beirut’s centra1 
Martyrs Square to protest at Hariri’s assassl 
nation and to demand the withdrawal ofSyrian 
troops from Lebanon , many signs featured 
pictures of dεspised p이iticians and security 
officers with ‘nominations ’ to be voted out 
ofthe ‘show’, a c1ear appropriation of reality 
television for political activism. One sign 
in partícular illustrated this appropriation. 1t 
featured a photograph of Lebanese president 
Emile Lahoud. a major ally of Syria whose 
mandate was unconstitutionally extended by 
Syrian fiat. with the word ‘nornmee ’ above 
the picture and the words ‘Vote 1559’ 
underneath it. St“r Academy, the Arabic 
language adaptation of a format owned by 
the Dutch format house Endemol and known 
in the UK as Fame AcadenlY, has been the 
Arab world’s most popular and controversia1 
reality television show. Every week, audience 
members call dedicated four-digit mobile 
phone numbers to vote for one of two 
nominees they wish to save from expulsion 
from the show. In the demonstrator ’ S slgn, 
‘ 1559’ is an ironic appropriation in that it 
refers to United Nations Security Council 
Rel‘olution 1559, which called among other 
things for the withdrawa1 of Syrian troops 
from Lebanol1 
This overlap of politics and popular culture 
is indicative of a larger trend in the Arab 
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world where political activists increasingly 
appropriate elements of youth media culture 
This can be seen on sevεrallevels. First of all, 
the use of mobile phonεs and text-messaging 
to mobilize support for a rea1ity television 
contestant and to forge alliances with like-
minded viewers has been transfeπed to 
the organization of political demonstrations 
Second, the hip sartorial style of reality 
telεvision and music videos is ernployed by 
demonstrators to attract the attention oftelevi-
sìon cameras, something that young Lebanese 
excelled at in the Beirut demonstrations 
Third, as the sign we analyzed indicates, 
the vocabulary of [1εality television is widely 
understood in the Arab world, and is thus an 
effective tool to express a political agenda 
Finally, activists who protested against the 
auth01itarianism of the Mubarak regime in 
Egypt, against Syrian control of Lebanon, 
or suppol1ed women’s political rights in 
Kuwait have become adept at adopting Sh011, 
memorable and media-friendly slogans like 
thε ones that penneate youth popular culture 
CONClUSION 
The relationship that Arab youth have with 
media and inforrnation technologies is highly 
complex. In addition to thε economic, social 
and cultural challenges faced by youth in 
developing countries, Arab youth and children 
have to contend with the radical polîticization 
of their relationship with media and culture 
Whεreas children and youlh wor1dwide are at 
the centεr of debates about edllcation, con• 
sumerism and socia1ization , in the Arab wor1d 
the youth and childhood are a180 a political site 
of struggle where hot-button isslles such as 
teIT01ism, A.Tab-Westem relations, and Arab 
govεmance play OUt. The corporations and 
govemments that cornpete to win over this 
demographic are not only Arab , but inc1 ude 
transnational corporations and the American 
gove111ment 
This media environment (what we refeITed 
to as hypennεdia space) provided this chapte, 
with several revealing case studies. First, the 
AI-Jazeera Children Channel Ìs a promîsing 
venture because it has a self-declared public 
service mission and at the same time it enjoys 
a secllre financial basis. As an initiative of 
Qatar’ s Sheikha Moza, probably the Arab 
wor1d’s most powerful and infiuεntial first 
lady, and ample funds from Qatar’s vast natu 
ral gas reserves at a time when gas is at a record 
high price, the Al-Jazeera Children Channel 
transcends two difficulties that have often pre-
empted successful children’s programs in the 
Arab world and elsewhere: political backing 
and financial resources. These two i8sues are 
most important because they determine how 
much support goes to local production. Also, 
finaljudgment will havε to await the channel’s 
actual perfonnancε and the degree to which 
it fulfills plans that for the most part are 
still on paper. There are two other challenges 
that the channel will have to overcomε 
attracting an audiencε and having competent 
management. Success in those areas may 
stimulate competitors and increase the quality 
and quantity of children prograll11lling 
Sεcond， it is c1ear that, in spite of the 
cornmercialization of sociallife, the new Arab 
commercial media environment enhances 
young people’s ability for self-expression and 
participation in pub1ic 1ife. The appropriation 
of reality tεlevision rituals and vocabulary 
during the 2005 Beirut demonstrations is 
perhaps the most notable εxample of how 
youth media clllture contributes to 80cial 
and p이itical εmpowerment， but examples 
elsewhere (Egypt and Kuwait) suggest that 
this trend can be found throughout th，ε Arab 
world. The ultimate challenge for Arab youth 
is t.ranslating the pluralism of publ ic life into 
inclusive goven디ance， taking into account the 
needs of children and young people in policy 
formulation and implernentation 
Third, rεIigion is imp0l1ant in the study 
of Arab youth and media as, on the one 
hand a social, cultural and political force , 
and, on the other hand, as a field of analysis 
Having said this, we should eschew making 
Islarn an independent vmiable sitting at 
the center of political, socio-cultural and 
communìcation processes in the Arab wor1d 
Rather, as the dεvelopment of Islamic mεdia 
and lslamic popular culture indicate, Tslarn 
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is a differentiated, complex, and unstablε 
categOlγ Jncreasingly, the Arab media are 
bεcorning an arena of competition betwecn 
various fonns of Islam, as in the example 
mentioned before of Khaled challenging 
al-Qaradawi ’ s interpretations, or of the varia• 
tions that are set to emerge between relatively 
traditionalistIslarnic channel , such as al-Majd 
and lqraa on the one hand, and, on thε 
other hand, those explicitly ‘modcmizing’ 
Islamic channels, such as al-Risala. Many 
analysts of Arab societies, us included, believe 
that mainstream Islamic media provide an 
important space for the emergence of modern, 
i.e. self-reflexive, adaptive, and forward 
thlnking Islamic values and identities 
In this chapter we havε attempted to provide 
a broad survey of the complex relationship 
betwecn young people and the rnedia in the 
Arab world. Socio-economic c1ass, geograph 
icallocation, religion and 1inguistic abi1 ity are 
some of the most important differences that 
shape how young Arabs relate to the media 
We adopted a top-down , deductive and mostly 
theoretical approach in order to accornmodate 
the large variety of issuεs to be discussed in 
order to understand Arab youth and media 
issues. This was partly due to the paucity of 
actual audience studies in the A1‘ab world, 
hindered by a variety of factors, including 
the lack of systematic indigenous research 
activity and social and religious restrictions 
on field research ‘ While the advantage of this 
approach is to account for the breadth of the 
topic, we point the readers to a variety of 
readings on Arab rnedia that provide more 
location- and culture-specific sources. 18 
NOTES 
1 We use 'Arab youth' broadly to include children 
We use 'children ’ only when 뼈re are issues where 
chi떠ren ， and not older young people, are the 
ex미 cìt focus of discus잉on， such as our discussion of 
미 Jazeera Children Channel 
2 The United Nations Population Fund 
Overview: The Arab 5tates. http://www.unfpa.org/ 
profile/arab_overview.htm [August 2007J 
3 For a detailed ana 야is and critique of this 
phenomenon , see Kraidy (2005) 
4 Here we are usinq Mead ’5 typology of postfigura 
tive, cofigurative, and pre띠urative cultαes， which in 
descending order give more importance to hierarchy 
and vertκallearning. See Mead (1 970) 
5 See Richard Agnew (2005) and 에z Khan (2005) 
6 For a history of some urban coffeehouses in the 
Middle East, see Kirli (2004) 
7 Second author intervi민N with Fouad Tarabay, 
10 니 nding Managing Oirector of Rotana Khale리 iah ， 
August 2005 
8 For a discussion of a crucìal period in the 
development of Lebanc γ5 television market, see 
Kr히dy (1998) 
9 The second author of this chapter was an MTV 
executive at the time. The show was renamed 'The 
Kids Power Show' for intellectuaJ property purposes 
1 。 이 Jazeera launche잉 d미dren's channel to teach 
t이erance (2005 , September 10). Daily Star [Agence 
France Pre잉se] 
11 In fact, 미 Jazeera offic떠lIy declared itself 
a 'network' , as opposed to a ’channel' , in early 
September 2005. See 'Before launching its c비dren ’s 
chann빈 next Friday: 이 Jazeera becomes a network 
for privatization 7' (2005, September 6). Assafir 
12 셰 Jazeera launches kids chann티 (2005 , 
September 11). Company Press Release 
13 'Before laun띠ng its ch뼈ren's channel next 
Friday: AI-Jazeera becomes a network for priva-
tization7' (2005, September 6). Assafir 
14 Personal interviews conducted by first author 
with members of the launching team , November 
2005 , Paris , France 
15 The word takfiri refers to the practice by some 
radicallslamists to declare Muslims who do not agree 
with t때 r 씨ews non-Mu찌ims， and thus indirectly 
promote violence against these ’fake' Muslims 
16 There could be an 'edutainment' trend develop 
ing in youth media, with Yemen recently announcing a 
new television service for young people in asso 디 atlon 
with the national university there 
17 See Kraidy (2006b); for a discussion of how 
realηy television entered the fray of politics in Kuwait 
and Lebanon , see Kraidy (2007) 
18 For gener비 references on Arab media, see 
Boyd (1999) and 5akr (2001). The volume by 
Eickelman and Anderson (1999) has a broader, 
Muslim world scope. For analysis of the Arab internet, 
see Gonzalez-Quijano (2003/2004). For 셰-Jazeera ， 
see EI-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) Lamloum (2004) 
For television and national identity in Egypt, see 
Abu-Lughod (2005) and Armbrust (1996). For a 
feminist, Islam-focused analysis, see μ ernissi (1992) 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Lughod, l. 2005. Dramas 01 Nationhood. Univer잉 ty 
of Chicago Press 
350 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE 
Agnew, R. (2005) 'The 때bian kings 이 cash'. Arabian 
8usÎness, 21 August 
AI-Ariss, 1. (2005) 'The children 01 AI-Jazeera'. AI-Hayat, 
31 Auqust 
Amin, A. (2005) ，미←Jazeera kids: when we p니t amate 니 rs 
in charge and we address the chi떠 "below his level'" 
셰 Hayat, 10 October 
Armbrust, W. 1996. Mass Culture and Mod낭rnlsm m 
Egyp t. Cambridge University Press 
Bouqanoun, 1. (2005) 메 Jazeera Kids .. A readinq of 
the notion and a critique of the vision' 께azeera.net， 
200ctober 
Boyd, D. (1999) Broadcasting In the Arab W<αld. lowa 
State University Press 
B 매 d， D. (2002) 'Radio Sawa: the 다eation 이 a new U.S 
government Arabic service' , In Annual Meeting of the 
Arab-US AS5ociation for Communication Educators, 
Beirut, Lebanon, November 
Buckingham, D. (2000) The Making 01 Citizens: Young 
People, News and Politics.london: University College 
London Press 
Department 01 Economic and Social Af1airs (2005) World 
Youth Report 2005: Young People Today, and in 
2015. New York: United Natκns 
Eickelman, D. (1998) 'Inside the Islamic relormation ’ 
The Wilson Quarte ι 22(1): 80-89 
Eickelman, D. and Anderson, J. (eds) (1999) New Media 
In The Muslim W<α"/d: The Emerging PU에t;c Sphere 
Indiana Univer히ty Press 
티 Nawawy, M. and Iskandar, A. (2002) AI-Jazeera 
Westvi민N 
GonzaleεQuijano， Y. (ed.) (2003-2004) l'internet 
arabe. Maghreb Machrek, 178 
Havens, T. (2001) Subtitling rap: appropriating The Fresh 
Prince 01 Bel 메r lor youthlul identity 10rmation in 
Kuwait. Gazette, 63( 1): 57-72 
Heelas, P. lash, S. and Morris, P. (eds) (1996) 
Detraditionalization. london: Blackwell 
Khalil , JJ. (2005) 'B언ndinq in: Arab television 
and the search for programming 띠eaζ Transna 
tional Broadcasting Journa /, 13. www.tbsjournal 
com/archives/Wint민2004.htm 
Khan, R. (2005) AI띠김leed: Businessman Billíonaiflβ 
Prínce. London: Harper Cc씨rn오 
Khouri, RG. (2005) 'Beyond sports and scouting: Arab 
youth imperatives'. Daily 5tar, 1 June 
Ki끼 i ， C. (2004) 'Coffeehouses: public opinion in the 
nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire'. In A. Salavatore 
and D. Eickelman (eds) Public /slam and the Common 
Good. leiden: Brill; 75-97 
Kraidy, M.M. (1998) 'Broadcasting regulation and civil 
society in postwar Lebanon'. Journal of Broadcasting 
and Electronic Media, 42(3): 387-400 
Kraidy, M.M. (1999) 'The global, the local, and the 
hybrid: a native ethnography 01 glocalization'. Critica/ 
5tudies in Mass Communication, 16(4): 458-478 
Kraidy, M.M. (2005) Hy，ψ diα or the Cultural Logic 01 
Globalization. Philadel메a: Temple University Press 
Kraidy, M.M. (2006a) 'Governance and hypermedia 
in Saudi Arab떠'. First Mondaι 11(9). http:// 
iirstmonday.orglissues/speciaI11_9/kraidylindex.html 
K떼dy， M.M. (2006b) 'Reality television and p이 itics 
in the Arab world (prelimina대 observat띠 ns)' 
Transnational Broadcastinq 5tudies, 2: 7-28 
Kraidy, M.M. (2007) 'Idioms 01 contention: Star 
Academy in lebanon and Kuwait'. In N. Sakr (ed.) 
Arab Media and Political Renewal: Communitι 
Legitimacy and Publκ LiI능 London, UK: I.B. Tauris; 
44-55 
lamloum, O. (2004) AI-Jazira: Miroir Rebelle et Ambigu 
du Monde Arabe. La Découverte 
livingstone, S. and M. Bovill (1999) 'Young peo미e， 
new media'. Report of the research 미oject Cana이 an 
Young People and the Changing Media Environment 
london: london School 01 Economics and Political 
Science 
Mead, M. (1970) Cul，ωre and Commitme η t: A 5tudy 01 
the Generation Gap. New York: Doubleday 
Mernissi, F. (1992) /slam and Democracy. Addison-
Wesley 
Ohrstrom, l. (2005) 'New kids' channel na씨gates 
“ edutainment"'. The Daily 5tar, 7 December 
Sakr, N. (200 1) 5at，하'lite Realms: Transnatíonal Televi-
51C 끼 Globalization and the Middle Eas t. I.B. T auris 
UNDP (2004) Arab Human Development Repoη 2003 
Bui폐'ng a Knowledge 50ciety. New York: United 
Nations Development Program 
Ziehe, T. (1992) 'Cultural modernity and individual-
ization'. In J. Fornas and G. Bollin (eds) Moves 
in Modernity. Stockh이 m: Almqvist and Wiksell 
Internatíonal 
FURTHER READlNG 
Kraidy, M.M. and Khalil, J.F. (2007) 'The Mi뼈e 
East transnational Arab t빈e씨slon ’ In l. Artz and 
Y. Kamalipour (eds) The Media Globe ηmds in 
International Mass Medía. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and little1ield; 79-98 
